Mexborough & Swinton Times – Saturday, 30 July 1904
The Denaby Strike: Legal Sequel – Another Chapter
Appeal To The House Of Lords
The Howden Case Reaches Its Final Hearing
Interesting Argument By Mr. Danckwertz, K.C.
The Lord Chancellor’s Humour
Full Descriptive Report
Mr. Danckwertz, K.C., Mr. Atherley Jones, K.C., M.P., and Mr. Compston appeared for the Trustees of the Yorkshire Miners’ Association; Mr. Rufus Isaacs, K.C., and Mr. Channell represented the Yorkshire Miners’ Association; and Mr. Montagu Lush, K.C., Mr. Waddy, and Mr. Wilberforce appeared on behalf of the respondent Howden.
The plaintiff, William Howden, was present at the opening of the proceedings, as were also Mr. Wm. Parrott, M.P., Mr. John Wadsworth, Mr. Fred Hall, Mr. George Henry Hirst (officials of the Yorkshire Miners’ Association), who were accompanied by Mr. Joseph Rater, the solicitor of the Association.
The LORD CHANCELLOR (at the outset): “How long do you expect this case will last, Mr. Danckwertz?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ, K.C.: “I think it is possible it will last the greater part of two days, my Lord.”
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “What, two days?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “At least two days.”
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “I had better tell you at once then that there is a case fixed for to-morrow, in which we are taking the unusual course of hearing two witnesses. That case cannot be postponed, because we have summoned the witnesses to be here, and we must hear them.”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “Will you continue this on Thursday?”
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “Oh! perhaps to-morrow, if we dispose of the other case.”
Mr. Danckwertz, proceeding to address the House, said this was an appeal by the Yorkshire Miners’ Association against a verdict of the King’s Bench Division. The officers of the Association were the appellants, and the respondent was Mr. Howden, who was formerly a miner at Denaby Main Colliery.
The action was brought by Howden against the Yorkshire Miners’ Association, and certain officials of the Association, claiming an injunction prohibiting the Association and its treasurer and officers from applying the funds in paying what might conveniently be called strike pay to certain branches of the Association.
In the court below, the only parties defendant to the action were the Association and the officials of the Association other than the trustees, but in the Court of Appeal, at a somewhat late stage of the hearing, the Court added the trustees as defendants.
There were two main points involved, and although there were several other points, they were of lesser importance.
The first point was whether or not, on any ground other than the Trades Union Act of 1871, the action could be taken at all, whether it was not one of those cases in which the Legislature legalised the Trade Union and authorised the Trade Union to proceed outside the jurisdiction of the Court.
The second point was whether or not the officials of the Association had in fact been paying strike pay contrary to the rules of the Association, as alleged by the plaintiff to the action.
The Yorkshire Miners’ Association was an association extending over Yorkshire, and it consisted of the Association itself, which was managed by a council elected by the members, and by an executive committee, which was a standing committee, and acted at all times throughout the year, and of a number of branches.
These branches, as a rule, corresponded to the collieries throughout Yorkshire; that was to say, there was a branch of the Association connected with each colliery, and each branch had its own officials.
The whole Association was governed by rules which were registered under the Trades Union Acts of 1871 and 1876.
The best way of dealing with the matter would be to put their Lordships in possession of the plaintiff’s claim.
If their Lordships would turn to page two of the appendix to the proceedings, they would see that the action was brought by William Howden, and that the first thing he said was that he was not suing on behalf of himself and other members in respect of any specific grievance. He was, therefore, driven to alleging that the whole of the Acts of the Association were illegal.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “Who is Mr. Howden? Is he an official of the Association?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “No, my Lord, he is not an official, but I believe he is a member.”
Mr. ATHERLEY JONES: “He has ceased to be a member of the Association.”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “He was a member of the Association at the time when he started his action.”
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “At the time he issued his writ?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “That is so.”
Continuing, he said the plaintiff Howden claimed for an injunction to restrain the Association from misapplying the funds of the Association, and dealing with the same contrary to the rules of the Association.
What that meant was this. There was a dispute between the parties whether there was a strike existing in accordance with the rules of the Association, and also whether or not there was a lock-out of the miners of two collieries, the Denaby and Cadeby pits.
The defendant Association and its officers honestly believed there was a strike or lock-out, and they paid strike pay, while the plaintiff alleged that there was neither a strike nor a lock-out at these collieries in conformity with the rules.
When this action came before Mr. Justice Grantham and a special jury, it was disposed of in a rather rapid manner, with a verdict for the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeal confirmed the result and granted an injunction on the ground that the Trades Union Act of 1871 did not prohibit recourse to the law courts, and secondly, on the ground that what the Association had done was ultra vires of the rules.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “Was it tried by a jury?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “Yes, it was, but I don’t know that much can depend upon the findings of the jury.”
Proceeding, he said there was an interim injunction which was dissolved, and a fresh injunction was granted by the Court of Appeal.
He would now ask their Lordships to turn to the rules of the Association, a copy of which was contained in the printed proceedings.
The first rule ran:
“This society shall be known as the Yorkshire Miners’ Association, and shall consist of as many members employed in and about the various collieries as may think proper to join. It shall be divided into as many branches as may be deemed expedient, and shall remain in existence under the above title, nor shall its funds, books, emblems, or other property be appropriated to any other use than as provided for in these rules, so long as fifty members remain in one or more branches remain together in the district and are willing to carry on its objects.”
Before he went further into the rules, he would like to make one observation. As was often the case with such societies, the rules were not well drawn.
Lord LINDLEY: “Did you ever see a well drawn set of rules?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “I am not quite sure, my Lord.”
Lord LINDLEY: “I am.” (Laughter.)
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “I have seen rules drawn by a very learned person for the administration of a court of justice, which were not by any means a model of clearness.” (Laughter.)
Mr. Danckwertz, proceeding, said there was an important sentence in the rule he had read. It declared that no property of the society should be appropriated for any other use than provided by the rules, and it was obvious what the Court of Appeal had done. It had granted an injunction with the intention of enforcing that rule without regard to the other rules providing the uses to which the property of the society might legally be applied.
Paragraph two of the rules contained power to alter the rules in the negative form that they should not be altered without the consent of the majority of the members.
Then came rule three, which set out the objects for which the Association was formed. The paragraph of this rule to which he wished to call attention was:
“To provide a weekly allowance for the support of members and their families who may be locked out or on strike; and to resist any unjust regulations in connection with their employment.”
Then came the paragraph upon which his friends for the plaintiff relied:
“The whole of the money received by this Association shall be applied to carrying out the foregoing objects according to rule; and any officer misapplying the funds shall repay the same and be excluded.”
The injunction granted by the Court of Appeal might also be assumed as enforcing the first part of that rule.
He thought he might now pass to rule 9:
“The Council shall not have power to lay levies on the members, or make grants to any cause, member, or purpose whatever until the same has been submitted to the branch for their approval or otherwise.”
He would also direct the attention of their Lordships to rule 27, which provided for the election of trustees to secure the funds of the Association; and he came now to rule 29, which stated:
“The duties of the Executive Committee shall be to consider and decide upon all cases of emergency arising between Council meetings, such as preparing programme for Council meetings, branch grievances, accepting and ordering the payment of victims, and all minor questions; but the Executive shall not decide upon questions relating to strikes, lock-outs, or voting money to other districts, or any amount in the district exceeding five pounds.”
There was nothing special in any of the other rules until they came to rule 53:
“There shall be for this Association one general fund, which shall be applied to the relief of those members and families who may have been thrown out of employment by strikes, lock-outs or victimised, and for management; and also to financial members at the time of death, whether accidental or natural, or to such other legal and necessary purposes as may arise from time to time amongst our members, such as grants to other trades, hiring rooms, interment of members, half-members, and members’ wives at death. This fund shall be under the guidance and control of the Association’s Council, and shall be expended and disbursed as provided by these rules.”
That was the point about which this dispute had arisen, and might be regarded as the foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeal.
Their Lordships would find that a good deal turned on the words, “thrown out of employment.” The Court of Appeal seemed to have interpreted them in the same way in which they would interpret the words, “thrown out of the street.”
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “Thrown how?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “Thrown out of the street, my Lord.”
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “The word street does not present itself to my mind.”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “It is an allegory, my Lord.”
Lord JAMES OF HEREFORD: “Thrown out of a window or out of a carriage sounds better.”
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “Thrown out of the street is not intelligible to me. I may be dense.”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “I will use Lord James’s expression then, and say ‘thrown out of a window.'”
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “We may imagine some physical force which caused a man to be thrown up in the air to come down in a place which was not the street. In that case you might say he had been, ‘thrown out of the street.'”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “A policeman might come along and take a man by the scruff of the neck and throw him into a shop, my Lord.” (Laughter.)
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “That would be taken out of the street.”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “Then I will say the Court of Appeal interpreted the words ‘thrown out of employment’ as they might interpret the words, ‘thrown out of a window.'”
Lord JAMES: “You had better let us have some facts, Mr. Danckwertz; we can apply that phrase afterwards.”
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “It is a very intelligible phrase itself.”
Mr. Danckwertz, continuing, said he came now to the history of the dispute, which originated at Denaby and Cadeby Collieries, and was brought about by this action.
On the 29th of June, 1902, a strike commenced at the Denaby pit, where there had been existing for a long time a dispute between the miners and the colliery company as to what should be paid for getting the bag-dirt.
The colliery company, on the one hand, had maintained that they were not bound to pay for getting the bag-dirt, and the men contended that if their employers were not bound it was only fair that they should be, and therefore ought to be a fresh contract entered into.
They said to the masters:
“Either you are bound to the existing terms of employment to pay for getting this bag-dirt, or if you are not let us revise these terms.”
Mr. Chambers, the manager of the colliery, took up the position that the terms of employment did cover the bag-dirt, and he refused to pay the men for getting it.
The dispute went on until the employers brought things to a crisis by sending men into the pit to remove the bag-dirt, and charging the cost of the work to the men who had refused to remove it.
On the 29th of June, when the men came out of the pit fully prepared to resume work on Monday morning, a very large number of men had considerable sums of money deducted from their wages to pay for the bag-dirt being removed by other men.
The sum deducted amounted in one man’s case to as much as 17 shillings.
That seemed to have exasperated the men, and on the 29th of June, which was a Sunday, the men held a meeting and agreed that they would not go back to their work on Monday morning unless their grievance were considered.
On the 30th of June they did not go back to work, and the pit stood.
Lord JAMES: “If the 29th of June was Saturday, Monday must have been the 31st.”
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “There is no 31st of June.”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “It is my mistake. Saturday was the 28th, and Sunday, when the meeting was held, was the 29th.”
Continuing, he said when the Executive of the Association heard what had occurred at Denaby, they at once said:
“You are wrong. You have no right to throw out of work without giving proper notice. You must go back to work and give your notice properly.”
A discussion of this kind went on between the Executive and the Branch officials for about a fortnight.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “I suppose they did not go back to work.”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “They did not go to work.”
Continuing, he said Mr. Chambers, the Colliery Manager, was written to by the officials of the Association, and he replied that the pits were open and the men could resume work when they liked.
On or about the 15th of July a meeting of the men was held at which a ballot was taken whether the men were ready to go back to work or not.
The ballot was in favour of returning to work and handing in notices, and on the 17th of July the men presented themselves at the pits for work, but a fresh dispute arose.
A special rule had been formulated by the colliery company purporting to be made under the Home Office requirements, but which the men thought to be illegal, and when the men went to work on July 17th, they were not only required to sign on again, but they were required to sign a fresh contract which contained this new rule, which had been no part of their old contract.
All the men had previously signed the contract book, but they had not been bound by any book which contained this new rule, and the men rightly or wrongly believed that if they signed this they would be prevented from raising the question whether the rule was valid in law, and consequently they were advised by the Association not to sign any contract containing the rule.
“Sign the old contract again,” said the Association, “and go back to work until your fortnight’s notice expires.”
The colliery company, however, would not permit the men to re-sign the old book, and in consequence of this the men did not commence working again.
At first it was not necessary to sign on again at all because the old contract was still running, but when the colliery company maintained that the contract was broken by the men absenting themselves from work then the men contended it was not necessary to sign a fresh contract, but they were willing to sign on the old terms.
The men contended all the time that the contract was continual and they were justified in this view because on the 14th of July the colliery company had issued a number of summonses against the men for damages for absenting themselves from work, thereby treating the contract as running.
Lord JAMES: “Then the men presented themselves on the old contract.”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “Just so, my Lord, and the men also objected to the contract with the new rule.”
Lord JAMES: “Does not the Statute require a new contract if there had been no new rule?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “Undoubtedly, my Lord, where the parties agreed that the old contract is terminated. This the men did not agree because at that time the Company were taking proceedings on the old contract.”
The men would, however, have waived that point and signed the old contract, but they thought if they signed a contract containing the new rule they would admit its validity.
Proceeding, he said that was the state of things, and the question was whether the men who, on July 17th, presented themselves at the pit, and were not allowed to go to work, their tools being still in the mine, were thrown out of employment as provided for by the rule of the Association.
That was one of the questions for debate by their Lordships.
His second point turned on rules 64 and 65, if their Lordships would turn to them.
Lord JAMES: “What is your second point?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “As to whether strike pay was paid ultra vires.”
Your Lordships will find the rules on page 12.
Rule 64 says:
“If any branch, member, or members, have grievances affecting their wages, mode, or manner of working, or the hours of labour, if the employees refuse to remedy those grievances, and after all proper and peaceful means have been tried to effect a settlement by deputation from members, with the advice and assistance of Council, and such member or members be permitted to cease work by the sanction of the Association in accordance with this rule, such members shall receive 5s. per week for all full members; 4s. 6d. per week for half-members, and 1s. per head per week for all children under thirteen years of age, until such time as they can resume work either at the place they left or at some other colliery, or the Council, with the sanction of the majority of its members, decide otherwise.”
The rule could be, said Mr. Danckwertz, proceeding, no dispute that in this case the men did have or “thought they had a grievance.”
Under the rule the men, if they could not induce their employers to remedy their grievance, might be permitted to cease work, and that permission, he submitted, had been granted by the Association upon its case.
The majority of the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Williams and Lord Justice Mathew, held that there had been no cessation of work within the meaning of the rule, but Lord Justice Stirling took the view that there had been a cessation of work.
Rule 65 provided:
“Any branch or portion of any branch, which may be locked out, or otherwise thrown out of employment, in consequence of any action that may legally have been taken by the Association to keep up the price or remedy any grievances either at that or any other colliery connected with the Association, the members of such branch shall be supported after the same rate as the members on strike until such time as they can get to work or the Association decide otherwise.”
The Association, rightly or wrongly, thought that the men ceased work with the sanction of the Association.
Their refusal to sign on again had been sanctioned by the Association on two grounds—first, that the old contract was running; and secondly, that there was a new rule.
The result of the refusal to sign was that their employers refused to allow them to go down the pit.
Lord JAMES: “Was that contemplated when this advice was given not to sign it?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “I think so, my Lord. At all events the Association did in substance sanction what the men have done.”
Proceeding, he said in rule 65 they again had the words “thrown out of employment.” He did not propose to argue further what was the meaning of this rule, because it was admitted that on and after July 17th, when the employers refused to allow the men to go down the pit unless they signed the contract book, they were thrown out of employment.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “That is not a matter of debate, then?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “It is not, my Lord.”
The matter of debate is whether there was a cessation of work under rule 64.
These, on the condition under the rules in debate, and, “I think your Lordships will have no doubt that what did happen on July 17th did happen with the sanction of the officials of the Association.”
Proceeding, the learned counsel said he had next to direct attention to rule 69, which provided:
“No branch member or members, who may be on strike, locked out, or victimised, shall be entitled to the support of the Association until such branch member or members have been on work six clear days, after which they shall be paid according to rule for every working day they may remain unable to find employment, or in case of strikes, are unemployed without the sanction of the Council.”
Then, as to strikes and how they were to be regulated, they had the law of the Association in rule 72, which said:
“No branch, or portion of a branch, shall be allowed to strike or leave off work with a view of causing the works to stand unless sanctioned by two-thirds of members comprising the branch, when such strike shall be determined by registered ballot; such vote to be obtained by the branch officials calling a special meeting of the said branch for that purpose; and each member shall have delivered to him one black and one white ball—the black ball denoting for the motion, and the white one against the motion, and when three has been fully explained for the calling of such meeting, each member shall deposit his ball into the ballot-box, which shall be placed upon the table for that purpose, and which shall designate his vote for or against the motion; but in no case shall such vote be legal unless three-fourths of the members composing such branch record their votes, and two-thirds of each votes being in favour of such strike. In all cases where a registered vote is taken such votes shall be counted up by four experienced members of the branch, and forwarded to the officers to be dealt with by the executive or Council meeting.”
He, the learned counsel, thought it was not disputed that this rule was complied with.
A ballot was undoubtedly taken, when the requisite majority voted in favour of returning to work and giving notice.
Subsequently there was a point raised that the ballot, instead of being taken by balls, was taken by papers, but he did not regard that objection as material, and he did not think their Lordships would consider it seriously.
The six clear days required by rule 69 had elapsed—the two branches which had ceased to work applied to the Association to be granted strike pay, and the executive met and considered the matter, and resolved that, according to the rules, the branches were entitled to strike pay, and therefore they were bound to give it to them.
Then Howden himself, among other members of the branches, received strike pay for two months, but in November, 1902, he was got at by the Colliery Company, and the action which was brought in his name was admittedly brought by the Colliery Company.
Lord McNAUGHTEN: “Is that admitted?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “Yes, it is.”
Mr. WADDY: “My Lord, it is not admitted. In cross-examination Howden said that if he had had the funds he would have brought the action sooner.”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “Do I understand my learned friend to say that the Colliery Company did not find the funds for the action?”
Mr. WADDY: “No, I did not say that.”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “Then my reply to Lord McNaughten is correct. The action is brought by the Colliery Company, for whom Howden is the catspaw.”
Continuing, the learned counsel said the whole case was this: Howden’s case rested on the expression, “thrown out of employment.” He was under the rules of the Association, and those rules both by express rule and by implied provisions laid it down that the Association could only utilise its funds for giving benefits by strike pay in accordance with the rules, and not otherwise.
Howden’s case was this:
“If you use the money of the Association and pay strike pay when you are not entitled, you are breaking the rules and misapplying your funds, and I am therefore entitled to an injunction compelling you to observe the rules and prohibit you from continuing to spend the money.”
One question was whether, having obtained such an injunction saying that:
“You shall not misapply the funds of the Association,”
that was an enforcement of the rules of the Association within the meaning of the Act.
That was one question upon which the Court of Appeal held that the action of the Association was not within the Act, and this brought him to the Act of Parliament.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “What is the Act of Parliament?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “The Trade Union Act of 1871, chapters 34 and 35.”
Before he read the section let me please expound how the law stood before the Act came to pass.
Trade Unions had certain practices which were not legal in civil law, and were even in some cases criminal.
The object of the Act was first, to render, if I may coin a word, non-criminal.
Lord JAMES: “Practically the intention of the Act was to bring them within the law, and legalise their contracts. Your Lordships will remember that Lord Esher and Lord Bramley tried one or two cases.”
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “Lord Esher and myself prosecuted together in one case. I remember, before the Act was passed.”
Mr. Danckwertz, continuing, said Section 2 of the Act dealt with the legalisation of Acts and combinations and contracts which had previously been criminal.
Section three dealt with the civil side of the matter, and Section four ran:
“Nothing in this Act shall enable any Court to entertain any action to enforce or give damages for breach of any of the following agreements,”
the agreements referred to being the rules for the government of members which were regarded as agreements entered into between the society and the members on joining.
One such agreement signified ran:
“Any agreement for the application of the funds of a Trade Union to provide benefits for members.”
The main words upon which the question turned here were the words:
“Nothing in this Act shall enable any Court to entertain any action for enforcing, etc.”
As he suggested the injunction claimed by Howden had been granted for the purpose of enforcing rule 53 of the society relating to the application of the funds, he submitted the injunction was bad, the Court being disabled from entertaining any action of the sort.
Lord JAMES: “How does that prevent one member from interfering with another member employing the funds?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “Howden’s point is that under the rules the funds have to be kept for providing strike pay or lock-out pay, and if you employ them otherwise you are acting ultra vires.”
Lord JAMES: “In other words that it was not good strike pay?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “That is what Howden claimed. I would call your attention to a judgment of the Lord Chancellor that the rules of the society are a contract between the members of the association, and that being so, Howden’s action is disabled in a Court of law.”
Lord LINDLEY: “Suppose the trustees were to run away with the money, do you mean to say he could not stop it?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “Oh no! There are special rules to deal with that, and there is a clause in the Act which provides for such a case also.”
Lord JAMES: “It is your contention, then, that the word agreement in the Act applies to the rules?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “I think it is unquestionably so.”
Lord JAMES: “Is there no other meaning to be attached to the word agreement in the Act except the rules?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “I will answer you fairly, my Lord. I think it is conceivable there might be an agreement outside the rules, but the common interpretation would be that agreements must be within the rules, and the Lord Chancellor has given judgment that the rules of a society constitute a contract among the members.”
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “Is it a judgment of mine you are referring to?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “It is, my Lord.”
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “What was it? I will send for it.”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “It was in this House. I have it here if I can find it. It is twelve appeal cases.”
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “Don’t interrupt yourself. I will look for it.”
Mr. Danckwertz said it was the 12 Appeal Cases 197. It was not under the Trade Union Act, but under the Analogous Friendly Societies Act, 1874.
Their Lordships addressed themselves all the time in delivering judgment as to what was the position of the society as affected by the rules, and they held that the rules were a contract between the members and as such binding upon them all.
So did Lord Bramley, and so did Lord Herschell.
Lordship’s express words were:
“The rules in this instance form the contract between the members of the society.”
Lord JAMES: “In the Friendly Societies Act of 1874, is the word agreement there?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “I don’t think you will find the word agreement. The conditions governing membership are referred to as rules.”
Lord JAMES: “Then what we have to consider is the statutory interpretation placed upon the word agreement.”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “I should just like to answer the point raised by Lord Lindley with reference to possible embezzlement of funds.”
Section 8 of the Act provides that:
“All rights in the present state of the Union is hereby invested in the trustees of the Union as appointed by the society under this Act,”
and it goes on to say if any officer or member of the society shall make a dishonest use of the funds or property of the society, then the trustees have power to prosecute or sue.
Lord LINDLEY: “I supposed there would be some provision of that kind.”
Mr. Danckwertz, proceeding, said there had been a number of cases decided upon this Act, and upon the interpretation of the section to which he had drawn attention, and in nearly all the cases the rules had been dealt with as an agreement under the section. The earliest case and one of the most important was that of Rigby v. Connol, and was the decision of the late Sir George Jessel. This was a case of importance, because it had been followed in subsequent cases, and also because of the view which Sir George Jessel himself took. It was the case of the journeyman hatters’ association. They denied to expel one of their members of their Union named George Rigby, who thereupon brought an action against the society to prevent them applying the funds of the society, in which he claimed to have an interest.
The only practical distinction between that case and the present one was that the former case the man had actually been turned out. Sir George Jessel held that the Court could not entertain the action, this being one of the matters mentioned by the Act as an agreement which the Court was disabled from interfering with.
The learned counsel then proceeded to read a lengthy judgment delivered by the former Master of the Rolls, and proceeded to say they might apply the case to the present issue.
As he understood Sir George Jessel, he (Mr. Danckwertz) pointed out that the right of the jurisdiction of the Court depended entirely on the question whether the plaintiff possessed some part of the property of the society, and had held that, being bound by the agreement of the rules, he did not possess any share in the property save with the consent of the majority of his fellow-members.
If they would apply that, here they found that Howden said:
“I am a member of the Union. I have an interest in the funds of the Union, and you are going to apply it ultra vires. I ask for an injunction, the effect of which will be to keep the property for the benefit of me when my turn comes.”
Could he go so far behind the agreement into which he had entered with the society under their rules?
The LORD CHANCELLOR: “The House must adjourn now.”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “As your Lordships please.”
Lord LINDLEY: “Is this case reported?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “The one I am quoting?”
Lord LINDLEY: “No, the present case?”
Mr. DANCKWERTZ: “Yes, my Lord.”
The House then adjourned. The case was second in the paper on Tuesday morning, but the case before it was not concluded at the rising of the House, and as the House does not sit on Wednesday, the appeal stood adjourned till Thursday.